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SOCIAL CONFORMITY DESPITE INDIVIDUAL
PREFERENCES FOR DISTINCTIVENESS
PAUL E. SMALDINO1,2 AND JOSHUA M. EPSTEIN1
Abstract. We demonstrate that individual behaviors directed at the
attainment of distinctiveness can in fact produce complete social confor-
mity. We thus offer an unexpected generative mechanism for this central
social phenomenon. Specifically, we establish that agents who have fixed
needs to be distinct and adapt their positions to achieve distinctiveness
goals, can nevertheless self-organize to a limiting state of absolute con-
formity. This seemingly paradoxical result is deduced formally from a
small number of natural assumptions, and is then explored at length
computationally. Interesting departures from this conformity equilib-
rium are also possible, including divergence in positions. The effect of
extremist minorities on these dynamics is discussed. A simple extension
is then introduced, which allows the model to generate and maintain
social diversity, including multimodal distinctiveness distributions. The
paper contributes formal definitions, analytical deductions, and coun-
terintuitive findings to the literature on individual distinctiveness and
social conformity.
Keywords: optimal distinctiveness, social influence, opinion dynam-
ics, anti-conformity
1. Introduction
Few would dispute that we humans make appraisals of our individual2
“distinctiveness,” that we differ in our needs to appear distinct, and that we
take actions (e.g., we alter our appearance or expressed opinions) to attain4
our distinctiveness goals. Furthermore, preferences for distinctiveness and
the associated remedial adaptation strategies are at work in the formation6
of social groups and networks, and in other cultural dynamics such as assim-
ilation or polarization. However, in the broad literature on the psychology8
and sociology of distinctiveness [1–11], there is little mathematical preci-
sion in defining “distinctiveness preferences,” and little explicit modeling of10
the individual behaviors adopted to satisfy them or the collective dynamics
generated by these individual adaptations.12
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Most formal models dealing with individual preferences for differentia-
tion posit strict anti-conformity, in which agents adopt whatever position14
constitutes the minority at a given time [12–16]. Such individual behavior
of course endogenously alters the distribution of positions and can produce16
interesting social dynamics. But it precludes the emergence of conformity,
our core concern. Relatedly, Smaldino et al. [17] modeled individuals with18
preferences for membership in groups with different degrees of numerical
predominance but this model was not concerned with individual differences20
or distinctiveness within a population.
To our knowledge, no previous model has formally defined distinctive-22
ness preferences as we do, or shown that the pursuit of distinctiveness, thus
defined, can lead to conformity. We provide simple and intuitive formal def-24
initions of distinctiveness preferences and the individual actions aimed at
satisfying them, and show that these yield counterintuitive social dynamics.26
Foremost among these is that a population of agents with fixed needs to be
distinct can self-organize into a state of strict conformity. We then show how28
an elementary, but also novel, extension of the model facilitates sustained
diversity in attributes of interest. We conclude with a brief discussion of30
several lines for future research.
2. Model 1: Distinctiveness in Units of Standard Deviation32
To keep the exposition as simple as possible, we imagine a fixed population
of N agents. They have only the following four very simple attributes: a34
position, information about the distribution of positions, a distinctiveness
goal, and an adjustment rule. Time in this model is discrete.36
(1) Position: At every time, t, each agent has an observable
“position,” xi(t). Position is a one-dimensional real-valued38
feature that agents can adjust.
For example, position could be an expressed taste or location on a left-40
right political spectrum. It is not a location in any landscape, network, or
other physical coordinate system. This version of the model is spaceless in42
that sense. Agents interact only with aggregate variables – the mean and
standard deviation of a distribution. They do not interact directly with one44
another. One could of course introduce spatial coordinates, neighborhoods,
networks, and direct interaction with other agents, but we hold off on these46
complexities here.
(2) Information: Each agent is assumed to know its own48
position, and to correctly estimate (i.e., to intuit) the mean
x¯(t) and standard deviation σ(t) of positions in the popula-50
tion.
Given a distribution of positions, it strikes us as natural to define dis-52
tinctiveness in terms of deviations from the mean. The simple intuition is
that, in a drab office where jet black suits are the norm, a dark gray one54
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may turn heads, whereas the ambient diversity of Times Square requires
far more flamboyance to be noticed. So, a fixed distinctiveness preference56
(in standard deviations) may elicit radically different behaviors in different
settings. Accordingly, we define ideal distinctiveness as follows:58
(3) Ideal Position: Agents have a fixed and unobservable
distinctiveness preference, δi. This parameter characterizes60
the individual’s ideal position; it is not absolute, but relative
to other agents in the population. Specifically, at any time,62
the ith agent’s ideal position x∗i (t) is given by
(1) x∗i (t) = x¯(t) + δiσ(t),
where σ(t) is the standard deviation of the population’s cur-64
rent positions.
A positive value for δi indicates an ideal position δi deviations above (e.g.,66
to the political right of) the population mean; a negative value indicates an
ideal position δi deviations below it. Some people might need to be three68
sigmas (δi = 3) from the mean; others are content to hover near the average.
We do not assume that any individual is consciously aware of, or could “tell70
you,” their delta, only that these preferences exist, and that agents adapt to
satisfy them.72
Note that, because ideal position is by definition relative to the distribu-
tion of other agents positions, different positions may be satisfactory (i.e.,74
equal to an agent’s ideal position) at different times, corresponding to dif-
ferent distributions of positions in the population. By the same token, a76
specific position may confer ideal distinctiveness today, but not tomorrow,
if the positions of other agents shift. Of course, individuals may find them-78
selves in positions that fail to satisfy their need for distinctiveness. In such
cases, they adjust their positions to better satisfy this need. As the simplest80
(error-correction type) mechanism, we posit the following
(4) Positional Adjustment Rule: At time t+ 1, individu-82
als adjust their positions at a rate proportional to their dis-
tance from the ideal at time t. Specifically, with x∗i (t) given84
by Eq. 1, each individual updates her position according to
(2) xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + k[x
∗
i (t)− xi(t)]
where 0 < k < 1 is an adjustment rate. (We exclude 086
and 1 since they, respectively, cancel all dynamics or impose
equilibrium in one step).88
So, the farther is your current position from that which would satisfy your
(fixed) need for distinctiveness, the greater is your adjustment in observable90
position. Equivalently, under this rule, an individual far from her ideal
position will move faster than an individual close to it. Several extensions92
and refinements are discussed later, but this (1)–(4) is the complete agent
4 SMALDINO & EPSTEIN
specification. Though spare, the range of social dynamics is surprisingly94
rich.
2.1. Behavior of the Mean. The first question one might pose is: Given96
a population of individuals with initial positions xi(0) and distinctiveness
preferences δi, how will the mean position behave? After a modicum of98
algebra (see Appendix B), we derive the change in the mean position ∆x¯ to
be given by100
(3) ∆x¯ =
k
N
∑
i
[x¯(t) + δiσ(t)− xi(t)],
which, by Eq. 1, is simply
(4) ∆x¯ =
k
N
∑
i
[x∗i (t)− xi(t)].
Eq. 4 implies that the mean position will not change if each individual is102
in an optimally distinct position, because if xi = x
∗
i , the right hand side
is zero. A different type of equilibrium is where agents are all placed at104
the same position. Whatever that common position may be, the mean will
not change because in this case the mean is the common position and the106
standard deviation is zero. So, by Eq. 3, there is no change in position. In
this sense, any possible position is an equilibrium, and the common position108
in which they are placed will be regarded by all agents as ideal. However, so
long as initial positions are not ideal or identical, no equilibrium is strictly110
attained, because the variance will never reach zero, but only approach it
as a limit. Our first and central result, whose robustness we explore in a112
number of settings, is that convergence toward this conformity limit occurs
despite positive distinctiveness preferences.114
2.2. Conformity Despite A Single Global Preference for Distinc-
tiveness. We begin with the simplest case, in which all individuals have116
the same fixed positive distinctiveness preference, δ (i.e., ∀i, δi = δ > 0).
Eq. 3 then becomes simply:118
(5) ∆x¯ = kδσ(t).
Since kδ is a constant, the rate of change in the mean position will be
proportional to the standard deviation of individual positions. But, what120
becomes of the standard deviation itself? It can be proven (see Appendix
C) that122
(6) σ2(t+ 1) = (1− k)2σ2(t).
This first-order difference equation is solvable analytically for the time evo-
lution of variance. Starting with any specified initial variance σ2(0), we have124
(7) σ2(t) = (1− k)2tσ2(0).
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Figure 1. The system converges on a single value when all
individuals share the same preferred distinctiveness. We first
illustrate example trajectories for (A) δ = 1 and (B) δ = 3.
(C) Equilibrium positions at convergence limit as a function
of δ for several distributions of initial positions. For these
and all other runs, N = 500, k = 0.01.
Eq. 7 makes clear that conformity (the zero variance state) is a limit. As126
noted earlier, if all agents are placed at a point, no one will depart. So, any
position can be an equilibrium. But because k is a real number strictly less128
than one, these equilibria, though attractors, are not strictly attainable from
non-equilibrium positions1. For any specified real number z > 0, however130
small, there is a time tz after which the standard deviation is less than z. In
any particular case, the waiting time will depend on k, δ, and other factors.132
As it does not affect our thrust here, waiting time will not be further pursued.
Notice that, although by Eq. 5 the mean position depends on δ, by Eq.134
7 the variance does not, but rather changes at a rate determined entirely by
k. This difference between the two moments’ dynamics is illustrated in Figs136
1A and 1B. In both cases, initial positions are randomly drawn from the
uniform distribution U(−1,1). The variance converges to zero in both cases,138
but the mean increases more with δ = 3 than it does with δ = 1, as the
above analytics would predict. Fig. 1C illustrates that the exact limiting140
position depends on both δ and the initial distribution of positions. Here,
1However, it can be shown that, when k is small and δ’s are identical, the equilibrium
position is well approximated by δσ(0).
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Figure 2. Individual preferences drawn from a normal dis-
tribution. (A–D) Example trajectories of runs, with s as
indicated. (E) The proportion of simulation runs (of 30) for
which the population converged as a function of s. (F) Mean
population position for convergent runs as a function of s.
This figure omits one outlier at (.96, −5.46).
initial positions are drawn from various Beta distributions, transformed so142
that the support is [−1, 1] (The uniform distribution is recovered when
α = β = 1; see Fig. A.1). For each such distribution we plot the single144
common position toward which all agents converge as δ is increased from
zero to 10. Despite fixed common preferences for individual distinctiveness,146
the population approaches global conformity in position.
Famously, Schelling’s [18] model showed that a macroscopic pattern of148
segregation does not warrant the inference that all individuals are discrim-
inatory. Here, a macroscopic pattern of conformity does not mean that150
individuals lack desire for distinctiveness. Indeed, even if all agents have the
same positive fixed preference for distinctiveness, and adjust their positions152
in proportion to their distance from this ideal, complete social conformity
occurs and persists (it is approached monotonically as a limit). Fig. 1C also154
indicates that, given a perturbation from any equilibrium position, variance
will again collapse to zero, but with agents converging toward a new com-156
mon position. The model thus offers an unexpected generative mechanism
for conformity. We now explore its robustness to selected variations.158
2.3. Heterogeneous Preferences for Distinctiveness Produce Bifur-
cation in Dynamics. In the scenarios presented thus far, agents had the160
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same positive distinctiveness preference, δ. A perhaps more plausible pre-
sumption is that individuals vary in their preferences for distinctiveness.162
Will this change our results? We begin exploring this question by assuming
distinctiveness preferences to be normally distributed with a mean of zero164
and a standard deviation of s. Dynamics are not as tractable analytically as
in the previous case, and we turn to agent-based simulations. For this and all166
subsequent simulations, initial positions are drawn from U(−1,1), N = 500,
and the adjustment rate k = 0.01. Before, with all agents having the same168
δ, we saw convergence to conformity. Is this result robust to heterogeneous
δs?170
Strikingly, simulations indicate that to some extent, it is! Even with het-
erogeneous preferences for distinctiveness, the population can still converge172
to a single position (Fig. 2A). However, if the distribution of preferences
is wide enough, the population instead diverges, with individual positions174
growing ever farther apart (Fig. 2B). Thus, as we increase this heterogene-
ity, a type of bifurcation occurs. For the normal distribution of preferences176
used in these simulations, this bifurcation occurs around s = 1. Specifically,
for s < 1, positions converge. For s > 1, positions diverge. For values of s178
very close to 1, we find that some runs converge and some diverge, due to
noise in the particular distributions of initial positions and distinctiveness180
preferences (Fig. 2E).
The speed of convergence or divergence was slowest near this tipping point.182
This illustrates an interesting feature of the model. When the standard
deviation of distinctiveness preferences is near the critical value of one, the184
population mean can change rapidly as individuals (asynchronously) update
their positions, while their positions relative to the mean will change very186
slowly. Fig. 2D illustrates that although convergence is assured, extremely
long periods of “quasi-stability” can be maintained, during which the mean188
increases. We examined the limiting point of population convergence for
heterogeneously distributed δs for runs in which the population converges190
(i.e., runs in which the standard deviation of positions was continuously
decreasing after an initial transient period of reorganization, which generally192
lasted about 150 time steps). We found that for convergent runs, the closer
was s to the critical threshold, the farther from the initial population mean194
was the point of convergence proper, as seen in Fig. 2F.
These computational findings are supported by analytical results with two196
agents, having distinctiveness preferences equal in magnitude but opposite
in sign (i.e., δ1 = −δ2). For this case, it can be proven that two agents will198
converge if and only if the standard deviation of the agents’ positions is less
than one (see Appendix E).200
2.4. Bimodal Distributions of δs: A Minority of Nonconformists. In
the previous section we assumed a unimodal distribution of δs. However, it is202
also possible that individuals would cluster around different preferred degrees
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Figure 3. Convergence positions for a minority of noncon-
formists. Initial positions were zero for conformists and 1 for
nonconformists. The color map is on a log scale and indicates
the limiting equilibrium position. That is, the color indicates
the point toward which the conformists and nonconformists
converge. The black area indicates values for which the sys-
tem diverges.
of distinctiveness. There are many possible multimodal distributions; we will204
consider two cases here.
We first treat the simplest case of a population with exactly two types206
of individuals: conformists and nonconformists. Conformists prefer to be
at the population mean (δC = 0). Nonconformists prefer to be distinct208
(δN > 0), but are otherwise identical. This case can be handled analytically.
There are two free parameters: δN , and the frequency of nonconformists in210
the population, p. In order to get dynamics, we assume that conformists
and nonconformists start at different initial positions, so that the standard212
deviation of positions is nonzero.
For a wide range of conditions, the system again converges toward a single214
value (global conformity). Fig. 3 shows that the limiting position will be
increasingly far from the initial position of the conformists when there are216
more nonconformists (larger p) or when nonconformists have more extreme
preferences for distinctiveness (larger δN ). Moreover, for every value of p,218
there is a critical value of δN , above which the population does not converge.
Specifically, this critical value is given by220
(8) δ∗N =
1√
p(1− p)
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Figure 4. A majority of conformists and a minority of ex-
treme nonconformists. (A-B) Two example trajectory plots.
(C) The mean position at convergence across 30 simulation
runs as a function of the size of the majority group. The
population rarely converged with more than 8% noncon-
formists.
(see Appendix D for derivation). Above this critical curve, the conformists
and nonconformists will grow ever farther apart, and their absolute positions222
will continue to increase. The area including and above this separatrix is
colored black in Fig. 3.224
Continuing to elaborate the model, we now explore dynamics assuming
heterogeneous distinctiveness preferences not with just two values as above,226
but with values clustered about two distinct modes. For convergent runs,
two possibilities suggest themselves. First, the majority, with preferences for228
very moderate distinctiveness (conformists) could assimilate the minority of
individuals, who have more extreme preferences for distinctiveness (noncon-230
formists). Second, a minority of nonconformists, though small, could dra-
matically influence the positions of conformists, moving them far from their232
initial positions. To explore these possibilities, we ran simulations in which
each agent’s distinctiveness preference was drawn from one of two possible234
continuous distributions. Nonconformists’ δs were drawn from a normal dis-
tribution with a mean of 3 and a standard deviation of 0.1. In order to236
highlight the pull of nonconformists, we let the mean δ of the conformists be
negative. Convergence to a positively valued position would thus indicate238
a strong influence of nonconformists. Conformists’ δs were drawn from a
normal distribution with a mean of −0.2 and a standard deviation of 0.3.240
Obviously, these numerical choices are purely illustrative.
In this computational experiment, when nonconformists were a small mi-242
nority, they tended to be assimilated into the majority as the population
converged toward conformity, as in Fig. 4A. However, a slightly larger mi-244
nority of nonconformists, still only 8% of the population, exerted a much
larger influence on the majority (Fig. 4B). Fig. 4C shows the limiting posi-246
tion of the population (for runs that converged) for differently sized minority
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groups. This illustrates another central finding: A small minority of extreme248
nonconformists can exert large influences on a population.
3. Model 2: Preferences for Absolute Distance from the Mean250
In the model above, an agent’s distinctiveness preference was defined
purely in terms of the population’s dispersion (specifically, in units of stan-252
dard deviation). We found that a consequence of this postulate is that the
population variance either approaches zero (global conformity) or diverges254
indefinitely. In real populations, a stable level of diversity may be main-
tained (e.g., a stable political spectrum) without either complete conformity256
or ever-widening divergence. What is the simplest and most natural way to
endow the model with this capacity?258
In the preceding variant, where a multiple of standard deviation was the
only distinctiveness metric, we saw that agents can converge to the identical260
position – which perforce is the mean. They have no problem with being
average in that case. We will see that if we add to the previous framework262
a little repulsion from the mean, the dynamics are altered substantially. In
particular, diversity can be maintained.264
We need only revise our formula for an agent’s ideal position as follows:
(9) x∗i (t) = x¯(t) + δi[σ(t) + ],
where  is a positive constant. Thus, even if the population were at global266
conformity, an agent would prefer to be δi units away from the mean. Note
that as long as  is small, distinctiveness is still approximated in terms of268
standard deviation when the variance is large. However, when the variance is
small, the new mean-repelling term will dominate. This model is otherwise270
identical to Model 1 (i.e., Model 1 is a special case of Model 2). How does
this small revision change the dynamics?272
If all individuals have the same distinctiveness preferences (i.e., ∀i, δi = δ),
we get conformity as before. However, instead of stabilizing at a single274
position, the population continues to move, as persistent feedback to be δi
units from the mean pushes the population ever upwards (Fig. 5A) (or276
downwards, if δ < 0). Things become more interesting when preferences for
distinctiveness are heterogeneous. For several cases of two values of δ, it can278
be shown analytically that the distance between the two groups of agents
will stabilize at a nonzero value (see Appendices D and E).280
3.1. Traveling Waves. Simulations further show that diversity will be sta-
bly maintained in populations with a wider range of distinctiveness prefer-282
ences, where stability is defined as the absence of consistent change in the
population positional variance after an initial transient period of reorgani-284
zation (in this transient period, agents effectively “sort” by δ order). The
absence of convergence is not the same thing as the absence of movement,286
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C B A 
Figure 5. Example trajectory plots for Model 2, patterned
after otherwise identical runs for Model 1. (A) Uniform dis-
tinctiveness preferences, δ = 1. (B) Normally distributed
preferences drawn from N(0, 0.9). (C) Bimodally distributed
preferences. 92% conformists’ preferences drawn from N(0.2,
0.3). 8% nonconformists’ preferences drawn from N(3, 0.1).
For all runs,  = 0.1.
however. Small asymmetries in the distributions of distinctiveness prefer-
ences and/or initial positions can lead to stable relative positions but a con-288
tinuously changing population mean, as in the traveling wave depicted in Fig.
5B.290
We also found that our model extension could stabilize the clusters of
conformists and nonconformists described in the previous section. Fig. 5C292
depicts a model run under conditions identical to Fig. 4B, but with the
new model extension. Instead of converging to global conformity as before,294
positional heterogeneity is stable in the population, resulting in persistent
majority and minority “factions.”296
4. Discussion
This paper has attempted to bring increased rigor and explicit modeling to298
the general field of individual distinctiveness and social dynamics. Using very
simple notions of distinctiveness preferences and simple rules of adjustment,300
we developed two models, each of which has produced several new results
(see Table A.1 for a summary).302
Model 1 demonstrates an unexpected generative mechanism for a ubiqui-
tous and important social phenomenon: conformity. Individual adaptation304
to increase inter-agent similarity is, of course, sufficient to generate confor-
mity [19–24]. But we demonstrate that it is not necessary, and indeed show306
that the quest for distinctiveness can also generate conformity. Conformity
of course occurs when people strive for similarity, but it evidently can also308
occur when people strive for distinctiveness. Perhaps, then, we should not
be surprised at its ubiquity.310
Moreover, this conformity was not dependent on our initial modeling as-
sumption of identical distinctiveness preferences. We showed that as long312
as the variance in individuals’ preferences is not too large, the population
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still converges toward conformity even with heterogeneous distinctiveness314
preferences. We then explored bimodally distributed distinctiveness prefer-
ences, finding that a small minority of nonconformists (fewer than 10%) can316
significantly change the position even of a large conformist majority. As in
human history, so in the model: extremists can matter. Of course, society318
also exhibits stable diversity.
Model 2 generalized Model 1 to include (absolute) repulsion from the320
mean, providing a simple mechanism sufficient to generate and maintain
diversity. Unexpectedly, the model also produces travelling waves in which322
the positional distribution retains its form while moving to the right over
time. For bimodally distributed distinctiveness preferences, clusters akin to324
“factions” emerge and are sustained.
All in all, a very simple explicit model was shown to produce a wide range326
of unexpected results, the central one being that conformity can emerge
despite individual preferences for distinctiveness – indeed, because of them!328
Further extensions such as the addition of space, agent movement, networks,
and multiple dimensions (beyond our single positional one) would doubtless330
enrich the dynamics and repay study, as would the addition of noise or bias to
the agents’ assessments of positional distributions. Contrary to inductivist332
legend, it often occurs in the history of science that theoretical work precedes
and guides empirical activity [25]. We would, of course, be delighted were the334
present theoretical work to have the same effect. Meanwhile, this elementary
model should contribute to the literature on social dynamics, by providing (i)336
mathematically specific definitions of individual distinctiveness, (ii) simple
agent adaptations meant to attain them, and (iii) the collective dynamics338
that result.
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Appendix A. The Model
An agent’s ideal location is:410
(10) x∗i (t) = x¯(t) + δi [σ(t) + ] ,
where x¯(t) is the mean location of the agents in the population, σ(t) is the
standard deviation of those locations, δi is the distinctiveness preference of412
agent i, and  is a factor representing absolute repulsion from the population
mean. Model 1 is defined by  = 0, and Model 2 by  > 0.414
At each time step, the agent updates its position according to
(11) ∆xi = k [x
∗
i (t)− xi(t)] ,
where xi(t) is the current position of agent i and k ∈ (0, 1] is an adjustment416
rate.
In the main text, Figure 1C illustrates the point of convergence for simula-418
tions in which all agents have the same distinctiveness preferences (∀i, δi = δ)
for several different initial distributions of agent positions. Agents’ initial po-420
sitions were initially randomly drawn from a modified Beta distribution with
support [−1, 1]. This transformation was necessary, because in the standard422
Beta distribution, values are instead drawn from [0, 1]. Figure S1 illustrates
the shape of these distributions. For all other simulations discussed in the424
main text, initial positions were drawn from a uniform distribution in [−1, 1].
Appendix B. Derivation of the change in population mean426
Here we derive an equation for the change in the population mean for
Model 1. Most generally, we start with428
(12) ∆x¯ = x¯(t+ 1)− x¯(t).
From equations 10 and 11, it follows that for an agent i,
(13) xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + k [x¯(t) + δiσ(t)− xi(t)] .
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Figure A.1. Probability densities of initial distributions of
agent positions featured in the main text, Fig. 1C. Distribu-
tions are Beta distributions, transformed so that the support
is [−1, 1].
Summing over all agents gives us
x¯(t+ 1) =
1
N
∑
i
xi(t+ 1)
=
1
N
∑
i
xi(t) +
k
N
∑
i
[x¯(t) + δiσ(t)− xi(t)]
= x¯(t) +
k
N
∑
i
[x¯(t) + δiσ(t)− xi(t)] .(14)
Then, by equations 12 and 14, we obtain the result shown in the main text,
∆x¯ =
k
N
∑
i
[x¯(t) + δiσ(t)− xi(t)]
=
kσ(t)
N
∑
i
δi.(15)
Appendix C. Proof that the population always converges when430
all agents have the same distinctiveness
preference432
Under Model 1, let all agents have the same distinctiveness preference,
i.e., ∀i, δi = δ. Since each individual records the same population mean and434
standard deviation, it follows that at time t, all agents will have the same
ideal position:436
(16) x∗(t) = x¯(t) + δσ(t).
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By equations 11 and 16, the update rule for each agent is given by
(17) xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + k [x¯(t) + δσ(t)− xi(t)] .
We will prove that this rule leads the population to converge by showing438
that the variance of agents’ positions at time t + 1 is always less than the
variance of agents’ positions at time t. Recall that the equation for variance440
is
(18) σ2 = E[(x2)]− x¯2.
At time t+ 1, the variance is given by442
(19) σ2(t+ 1) =
1
N
∑
i
x2i (t+ 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P
− x¯2(t+ 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q
We decompose the problem by first solving for P and Q, as shown in
equation 19. To make the derivation cleaner, we’ll drop the “(t)” when
indicating variables taken at time t. We start by solving for Q.
x¯2(t+ 1) =
[
1
N
∑
i
(xi + k[x¯+ δσ − xi])
]2
(20)
= [x¯+ k[x¯+ δσ − x¯]]2(21)
= [x¯+ kδσ]2(22)
= x¯2 + k2δ2σ2 + 2kδσx¯(23)
Now we solve for P .
x2i (t+ 1) = [xi + kx¯+ kδσ − kxi]2(24)
= x2i + 2kx¯xi + 2kδσxi − 2kx2i
+ k2x¯2 + 2k2δσx¯− 2k2x¯xi
+ k2δ2σ2 − 2k2δσxi + k2x2i
= (1− k)2x2i + k2δ2σ2 + k2x¯2 + 2k[x¯xi + δσxi]
+ 2k2[δσx¯− x¯xi − δσxi](25)
Taking the expectation of P (summing over all the i’s and dividing by N)
gives us:444
(26) E[(x2(t+ 1))] = (1− k)2E[(x2)] + k2δ2σ2 + 2kx¯2 + 2kδσx¯− k2x¯2
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Reassembling these components, we see that
σ2(t+ 1) = E[(x2(t+ 1))]− x¯2(t+ 1)
= (1− k)2E[(x2)] + k2δ2σ2 + 2kx¯2 + 2kδσx¯− k2x¯2
− x¯2 − k2δ2σ2 − 2kδσx¯
= (1− k)2E[(x2)]− (1− k)2x¯2
= (1− k)2 [E[(x2)]− x¯2] .(27)
Combining equations 18 and 27 produces the equation given in the main
text:446
(28) σ2(t+ 1) = (1− k)2σ2(t).
Since k is bounded in (0, 1], equation 28 implies at each time step, the
variance of agent positions will be strictly less than in the previous time448
step. In other words, the population variance will always converge to zero:
agents will occupy the same position, as claimed.450
Appendix D. Proof that up to a critical value of δN , when
there are conformists and nonconformists,452
positions converge
Assume two homogenous subpopulations: conformists (C) and noncon-454
formists (N). Conformists want to be like the average individual, so δC = 0.
Nonconformists want to be different (but to an identical extent), so δN =456
δ > 0. The frequency of conformists in the population is p, so the frequency
of nonconformists is 1−p. We will work out the math using the assumptions458
of Model 2, but will show that the results specialize to Model 1 (by setting
 = 0).460
The mean position is
(29) x¯ = pxC + (1− p)xN ,
and the variance of positions is462
(30) σ2 = p(1− p)(xN − xC)2,
so the standard deviation is
(31) σ = [p(1− p)] 12 (xN − xC).
Now we solve for how the agents’ positions change over time.464
∆xC = k [x¯− xC ](32)
= k [pxC + (1− p)XN − xC ](33)
= k(1− p)(xN − xC)(34)
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∆xN = k [x¯− xN + δ(σ + )](35)
= k
[
pxC + (1− p)xN − xN + δ[p(1− p)] 12 (xN − xC) + δ
]
(36)
= k
[(
−p+ δ[p(1− p)] 12
)
(xN − xC) + δ
]
(37)
We are interested in convergence and divergence of the two populations,
so let us define a variable D to be the distance between conformists and
nonconformists, and observe how this distance changes over time.
∆D = ∆xN −∆xC
= k
[(
δ[p(1− p)] 12 − 1
)
(xN − xC) + δ
]
(38)
An equilibrium will exist when ∆D = 0. Setting equation 38 to zero yields
(39) xN − xC = δ
1− δ[p(1− p)] 12
When  > 0 (Model 2), we can get stable coexistence of two populations466
separated by a fixed distance. If  = 0 (Model 1), then the population will
either converge to a single value, or diverge. We began by assuming that468
xN > xC , and there is no mechanism by which this relationship can reverse.
Therefore, stability/convergence will only occur if the denominator of the470
right-hand side of equation 39 is positive. More precisely, the condition for
convergence in Model 1 and stability in Model 2 is472
(40) δ <
1√
p(1− p) .
This implies the separatrix equation (Eq. 8) of the main text. Importantly,
when  > 0 (Model 2), stability does not imply that the agents remain in the474
same positions over time, only that they are in the same relative positions –
that is, the distance between the conformist and nonconformist populations476
does not change. Indeed, the population can get caught in a feedback loop in
which the average position increases indefinitely, as illustrated in the main478
text.
Appendix E. Stability and convergence with two agents480
possessing equal but opposite distinctiveness
preferences482
Consider a very simple case of Model 2: a population of two agents, each
with equal but opposite distinctiveness preferences (i.e. δ1 = −δ2). For484
simplicity, let δ1 = δ and δ2 = −δ, and assume δ ≥ 0. We will further
assume that at t = 0, x1 > x2. Due to the relationship between the two486
agents’ distinctiveness preferences, this ordering will not change. The agents’
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mean position is given by x¯ = x1+x22 , and their standard deviation by σ =488
1
2(x1 − x2).
The agents update their positions according to the following:
∆x1 = k [x¯− x1 + δ1(σ + )](41)
= k
[
x1 + x2
2
− x1 + δ
2
(x1 − x2) + δ
]
(42)
and
∆x2 = k
[
x1 + x2
2
− x2 − δ
2
(x1 − x2)− δ
]
.(43)
Let us define D as the distance between the two agents, so that D =
x1 − x2. This distance changes according to:
∆D = ∆x1 −∆x2
= k [x2 − x1 + δ(x1 − x2) + 2δ]
= k [(δ − 1)(x1 − x2) + 2δ](44)
We want to know if and where the equilibrium lies. In other words, when490
do the agents stop moving relative to one another, so that ∆D = 0? Setting
the right-hand side of equation 44 to zero, we obtain492
(45) x1 − x2 = 2δ
1− δ .
Equation 45 implies two things. First, if  = 0 (Model 1), then the only
equilibrium occurs when the agents occupy the same location. If the distance494
between the two agents is growing, it will continue to increase. Second, if
 > 0 (Model 2), then the agents will reach a stable relative positioning if496
and only if δ < 1.
It is noteworthy that if δ = 1 (a singularity of equation 45), then the498
standard deviation of the δs is also 1, which was the transition point be-
tween convergence and divergence for normally distributed distinctiveness500
preferences obtained via simulations in the main text.
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MODEL 1: DISTINCT. PREFERENCES IN UNITS OF STANDARD DEVIATION
Condition Result
All agents have the same δ When all agents have the same δ, positions converge to
a single point, approaching global conformity despite
a fixed preference for distinctiveness
Heterogeneous δs (general)
Agents converge to a single position, as long as the
variance in distinctiveness preferences is not too large.
When the variance of δs is large enough, the popula-
tion diverges.
An unstable equilibrium also exists in which all agents
are initialized in their ideal positions. Minor pertur-
bations will lead to either convergence or divergence.
Normally distributed δs For normally distributed δs with a mean of zero, bi-
furcation between convergence and divergence occurs
at a SD of 1. Near this value there is high sensitivity
to initial conditions regarding convergence or diver-
gence. For convergent runs, the mean position can
move a large distance from its initial value before the
population converges.
Bimodally distributed δs A relatively small minority of nonconformists with
large δ can significantly change the position of an over-
whelming majority of agents who have very small delta
(conformists).
All convergent runs The limit point of convergence depends on both δ and
the initial distribution of individuals’ positions.
MODEL 2: DISTINCT. PREFS. INCLUDE ABSOLUTE DISTANCE FROM MEAN
Condition Result
All agents have the same δ Agents converge to the same position, but this position
continues to move.
Heterogeneous δs
Diversity is maintained, as the standard deviation con-
verges to a nonzero constant.
The population mean may continue to change, result-
ing in a “traveling wave” of positions.
Bimodally distributed δs Diversity can be maintained with persistent “fac-
tions.”
Table A.1. Summary of results for Models 1 and 2
